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India’s Compulsory License Model: Increased
Pharmaceutical Access and Innovation Coexist
Bela Gandhi1

P

atented medicine is a key issue for India where there is a high
burden of disease, low coverage, and low per capita income.2
India is known as the “pharmaceutical capital” of the world.3
Generic duplicates of foreign-developed drugs permit low out-ofpocket expenses for Indian citizens.4 Despite criticism of generics,
it is difficult to deny that quality of life is better for India’s citizens
who could not afford drugs if they were patented, branded, and sold
at higher prices.
Indians value affordable medicine for all. Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi expresses this value in a statement: “My idea of a better
ordered world is one in which medical discoveries would be free of
patents and there would be no profiteering from life or death.”5 This
principle is important enough to create a provision in the Constitution:
1
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“The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the
standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health
as among its primary duties.”6 This reveals the public health motivations behind the Indian Patent Act of 1970. The Act took measures
to protect pharmaceuticals from monopolistic practices that would
make them inaccessible to many citizens. One of these measures is
known as a compulsory license, “authorization permitting a third
party to make, use, or sell a patented invention without the patent
owner’s consent.”7
However, compulsory licensing can hurt profits which corporations have a vested interest in maintaining. A common western
concern is that when patents are not protected innovation may be
discouraged and alleged intellectual property rights might be denied,
thus disincentivizing corporations from patenting pharmaceuticals
in India. “U.S. companies [call this restriction] a patent violation
while the Indian government calls it a legitimate right.”8
Despite potential profit loss, compulsory licenses improve lowand middle-income countries’ (LMI countries) access to medicine.
In India, compulsory licensing has increased access to medicine
while also incentivizing innovation within the country through its
2005 Patent Act. As such, India should serve as a legal model for
LMI countries in protecting public health through compulsory licenses. By using compulsory licenses India has controlled multinational corporations (MNCs) and provided reliable and steady prices
for populations.
This paper begins in Part I by briefly summarizing India’s role
in access to medicine and how the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement provides compulsory
licenses to better serve medical crises around the world. Similarly
6
7

India Const. art. 47, § 4.
Cheri Grace, Equitable Pricing of Newer Essential Medicines for DeCountries: Evidence for the Potential of Different Mechanisms 47 (2003).
veloping
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P.B. Jayakumar, Patently Justified, Business Today (Mar. 15, 2015)
https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/features/us-mounts-pressure-onindia-on-pharma-ip-protection-impact/story/215947.html.
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situated countries are addressed in part II. Part III discusses the
Nexavar case that granted a compulsory license under section 84
of India’s 2005 Patent Act. This case gives insight into the government of India’s views on decreased cost of medicine and the role of
compulsory licenses. This section will also discuss the rejection of
a separate compulsory license application and what precedents the
Indian government makes by this ruling. Part IV describes a broad
range of allowances to compulsory licenses under section 92 and
discusses India’s cleverly incorporated section 92A which allows
exportation of pharmaceuticals with a compulsory license. Part V
focuses on a case of preventative action by a company to avoid compulsory licensing. The consequence of this action has led to creation
of biosimilars. Part VI will discuss the concerns about compulsory
licenses inhibiting innovation and demonstrate why compulsory licenses can provide novel innovation within India’s model. To conclude, part VII discusses India’s compulsory licensing system and
improvements that should be made.

I. Background
In the Patent Act of 1970, pharmaceutical product patents were
prohibited, but process patents—the protection of drug manufacturing methods and equipment—were allowed. With pharmaceutical
product patents out of the way, India began production of generic
drugs at a fraction of the cost.9
When India joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), it was
required to comply with the TRIPS agreement thus compelling India
to patent pharmaceutical products. The Indian Patent Act of 1970
was amended accordingly and is known today as the Patent Act of
2005.10
Before a compulsory license can be granted a request must be
rejected for a voluntary license—when a patent holder allows other
companies to manufacture and distribute its patented drug. This
9
10

Mueller, supra note 4, at 491, 576.
Murphy Halliburton, India and the Patent Wars: Pharmaceuticals in
New Intellectual Property Regime 21-37 (2017).
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ensures that MNCs take seriously the requests of local companies.
TRIPS specifies when a compulsory license is granted that the patent
holder must be compensated. Typically, this means that the patent
holder is paid 6% of total profits from the generic version. Due to
the forced nature of compulsory licensing, the patent holder does not
get to negotiate the royalty.11 TRIPS recognizes that LMI countries
are vulnerable to high prices of protected pharmaceutical patents, so
the organization safeguards access to medicine using compulsory
licensing.12 The 2005 Patent Act is compliant with TRIPS and additionally safeguards public health with its own amendments.
Further, the Indian government stipulates its own requirements
to affirm a compulsory license. The 2005 Indian Patent Act allows
compulsory licensing in situations beyond a “national emergency.”
This protects public health, domestic and abroad, from the potential
harm of patents. In this way, India seeks to maintain balance between
rewarding innovations while also providing access to medicine.13

II. Similarly Situated Countries
India’s model to achieve access to medicine and promote local
infrastructure can be implemented by similarly situated countries.
Similarly situated countries are LMI countries with a disparity in
pharmaceutical access. To achieve India’s independence within the
pharmaceutical industry, these countries will have pharmaceutical
infrastructure to manufacture their own drugs when a compulsory
license is granted. Countries like Jordan already have measures in
place to protect compulsory licensing. Now, there is an opportunity
to benefit from further protection while promoting innovation within
its nation.

11

Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International
Agreements on Patents and Related Rights 137-138 (1st ed. 2011).

12

WTO, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (2018).

13

S. S. Rana & Co., Compulsory Licensing of Patents in India,
SSRANA (2012), https://www.ssrana.in/Intellectual%20Property/Patents/
Patents_CompulsoryLicensing.aspx.
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Jordan’s patent law allows compulsory licensing but fails to
elaborate or clarify “patent holder abuse” and failure of the pharmaceutical to work within Jordan.14 The next section describes how
India protects its citizens from these issues.

III. Section 84 of India’s Patent Act and the Nexavar Case
Section 84 of the Patent Act protects India from anticompetitive
practices and abuses of power by MNCs.15 India affirms through section 84 of the India’s Patent Act local companies right to challenge
the patentholder. A challenge to produce a generic pharmaceutical is
based on MNC violations of the following.16
84. At any time after the expiration of three years from the
date of the grant of a patent, any person interested may make
an application to the Controller for grant of compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds, namely: —
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, or
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public
at a reasonably affordable price, or
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory
of India.17
A compulsory license under section 84 may be granted when the
patented drug is unavailable, unaffordable, or not supplied properly
to the public. This is done so patents do not impede the country’s
overall health. Anticompetitive behavior is addressed by Jordan in
14

Wael Armouti. Grounds for Compulsory License with Selected Cases
Granted for Pharmaceuticals, 26 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 381, 402
(2018).

15

Id. at 388.

16

E. J. Lane. Indian Court Upholds BMS Sprycel Patent, but List of Challengers Grows, FiercePharma https://www.fiercepharma.com/regulatory/
indian-court-upholds-bms-sprycel-patent-but-list-of-challengers-grows
(last visited Jul. 7, 2015).

17

The Patents Act, 1970, Subs. by Act 15 of 2005, S. 52 http://indiacode.
nic.in.
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its patent law in article 22.c “if it is decided judicially or administratively that the Patentee practices his rights in a manner that deters third parties from fair competition.”18 However, deterring third
parties does not stop other anticompetitive behavior such as excessive pricing or lack of availability, issues that largely affect patients
rather than third parties.
India’s first granted compulsory license under section 84 was
based on what India’s Patent Controller deemed an unreasonable
price for patients and local manufacturers. In doing so, the Patent
Controller neglected consideration for the patent holder’s R&D
investment.19
The granted compulsory license was for the kidney cancer drug
sold as Nexavar by the company Bayer. In 2008, Nexavar was patented in India. Four years later, an Indian company, Natco Pharma,
applied for a compulsory license after Natco Pharma’s voluntary license application was quickly rejected by Bayer.20 In August 2011,
Natco Pharma filed a compulsory license application with the Patent
Controller. In March 2012, the Controller General of Patents granted
Natco Pharma the compulsory license on Nexavar.21
Natco Pharma was granted the compulsory license because
Nexavar did not reach 98% of the Indian population due to a disparity in price. Bayer valued the drug at $5,000 a month while Natco
Pharma suggested the price of $170 a month, an approximately 97%
decrease in total cost.22 Bayer held on to an unrealistic price for the
Indian market. The compulsory license was granted because Nexavar was considered unaffordable. This violated the requirement in
Section 84(b) that the drug be available to the country’s population
18
19

Law No. 32 of 1999 (Jordan). See also Armouti, supra note 14, at 388.
Thaddeus Manu Building National Initiatives of Compulsory Licences, 14
& pol’y. 23, 23-48 (2015).

j. int’l trade l.

20

Natasha Nayak, Enhancing affordable pharmaceutical healthcare: Possibilities in Indian competition law regime, 53 econ. & pol. wkly. 48, 51
(2018).

21

Manu, supra note 19, at 23-48.

22

Nayak, supra note 20, at 49.
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at a reasonable price. This case brought forth the debate of how “reasonable affordability” should be defined.23
Bayer attempted to justify its price of Nexavar citing R&D’s
incurred costs during development. Bayer reasoned that generic
companies incur no such R&D costs, thus allowing generics to be
approximately 97% less than the branded drug. However, during the
trial, Natco Pharma argued that the price of Nexavar in India should
not be determined under the assumption that the entire R&D costs
for a drug sold internationally be collected from the Indian market alone.24 Natco Pharma reminded the court that Bayer had made
an inappropriate assumption because they sell Nexavar in multiple
countries, making Bayer’s logic unfounded.
The justification for R&D as explained by Bayer either meant
India is the only country where Bayer retrieved profits, or each country where Nexavar is sold is required to pay the same incurred costs
from R&D. The cost of Nexavar must be recouped in order for Bayer
to launch other pharmaceuticals, but Bayer is not entitled to profits
for R&D costs multiple times over from multiple countries.
Ultimately, the Patent Controller agreed with Natco Pharma that
a “reasonably affordable price” described in section 84 should be
seen from the public’s perspective, rather than from a company’s
perspective. Moving forward the Nexavar case could affect future
appeals as India’s judiciary appears to rule more often in favor of
the patients.25 After the Patent Controller granted the compulsory
license, Bayer tried appealing to the Indian Patent Appellate Board
(IPAB). The appeal failed, and the board upheld the decision made
by the Controller. Bayer’s appeal was denied because Nexavar was
not available to the public at an affordable price. Reasonable affordability defined by the perspective of the public was the standard the
Controller defined and the IPAB confirmed.
23

Manu, supra note 19, at 23-48.

24

Nayak, supra note 20, at 50-52.

25

Savita Gautam & Meghna Dasgupta Compulsory Licensing: India’s
Maiden Experience, asia pac. res. & training network on trade 1, 9-12
(2013), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/103872/1/774037490.
pdf.
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The Natco-Bayer outcome should serve as a blueprint for the Indian government to increase access to medicine through decreased
prices. Domestic companies and government agencies should start
applying for more compulsory licenses. This will increase competition among pharmaceutical companies, thereby regulating pharmaceutical prices.26
TRIPS justified the outcome. Member states of the WTO are allowed to stipulate when compulsory licenses may be granted. India
followed its laws on compulsory licensing. Section 84 allowed India
to give a compulsory license and protected India from international
intervention.27 28
Complying with TRIPS, Natco Pharma originally applied for a
voluntary license. A short time after the voluntary license was rejected the company was granted a compulsory license by the Controller. Natco Pharma’s single attempt, which the IPAB identifies
more as a notice than a request, gave Natco Pharma the right to seek
a compulsory license. Even though the IPAB recognized the voluntary license application as a notice, the compulsory license was still
approved. Essentially Natco Pharma demanded a voluntary license
from Bayer.
Although Natco Pharma did not break any of the requirements to
earn a compulsory license, the way it handled its voluntary license
application is cause for concern. If voluntary licensing is not taken
seriously it does not give MNCs the opportunity to review local applications. A poor attempt at applying for a voluntary license weakens the TRIPS stipulation. By ignoring this issue India’s government
undermines voluntary licensing that is meant to protect MNCs and
incentivize them to produce generic products. Moving forward India

26

Id. at 9-12.

27

ustr, 2013 Special 301 Report, off. u.s. trade representative, 1, 38
(2013). See also ustr, 2018 Special 301 Report, off. u.s. trade representative, 1, 49 (2018).

28

USTR, USTR releases 2018 special 301 report on intellectual property
rights, ustr (2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
press-releases/2018/april/ustr-releases-2018-special-301-report.
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should require that generic companies to go through a standardized
application process to earn a voluntary license.
Though the Controller recognized Natco Pharma’s weak application attempt, the compulsory license was still awarded to them.
This situation makes clear that the Controller and the IPAB are extremely favorable towards the applicant and sets a precedent about
how easily a company may obtain a compulsory license in the future. Without extra safeguards to protect companies from a compulsory license through a more stringent voluntary license application
process, MNCs could become an easy target and be incentivized to
withdraw their business from India entirely.29
Despite the court’s leanings, compulsory licenses are far from
normal. India’s patent laws do not immediately favor generic companies over patent holders. An Indian company, BDR Pharmaceuticals,
sought a compulsory license by citing a provision in India’s Patent
Act which tries to prevent “evergreening” as the basis for its compulsory license application. Evergreening is an attempt to approve
a new patent over a seemingly new chemical compound or active
ingredient thought to be “discovered” in a drug wherein reality it is
only an attempt to extend the patent of the original drug.30 BristolMyers Squibb, the patent holder, won the verdict from Delhi’s High
Court to uphold its patent on the leukemia drug, Sprycel (dasatinib).31
BDR violated the TRIPS requirement of first applying for a
voluntary license—a requirement India knows must be upheld to
ensure future compulsory licensing. After examining the case, the
Delhi High Court rejected BDR’s right to a compulsory license
because evergreening violations are not a standard for upholding a
compulsory license.
29

Anu Singhai & Manu Singhai, A Study of Natco v. Bayer Case: Its Effect
and Current Situation, 2 mit int’l j. pharmceutical sci. 21, 21-23 (2016)
https://www.mitpublications.org/yellow_images/20182-article-4.pdf.

30

Ruth Pollard, Old Becomes New in the Evergreen World of Medical
Money Miracles, Sydney Morning Herald (Austl.) at A4 (Aug. 13,
2004), https://www.smh.com.au/national/old-is-new-in-evergreen-worldof-medical-money-miracles-20040813-gdjjhh.html.

31

Lane, supra note 16.
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Evergreening is illegal in India, but that does not mean a company has made their drug unavailable, unaffordable, or unsupplied
as addressed in section 84. The basis of BDR Pharmaceuticals’ claim
had no foundation. While India has strict laws to protect against
MNCs taking advantage of its citizens, India does not ignore the law
to allow a compulsory license whenever a corporation appears to
be taking advantage of the population.32 India has focused the rules
regarding compulsory licensing around its citizens, ensuring that the
basic right to healthcare is possible.
If BDR applied for a voluntary license it may have had reasonable grounds to pursue a compulsory license under section 84. BDR
had submitted its price of $116 per month for a patient in need of
Sprycel for chronic myeloid leukemia. Bristol-Myers priced the
drugs at $2,383. Perhaps if BDR followed all the stipulated requirements, its chances of a compulsory license would have increased.
The government of India does not hand out compulsory licenses
every time they are requested. Both of these case outcomes are decided in a court of law and reflect India’s laws and rules. India desires to protect its citizens from corporations. Access to medicine
still is a rampant problem.
Yet, the BDR case is a reminder that India does not forget its
laws. Instead, it works through its legal framework to achieve greater medicine access. By using specific language, India has protected
itself from MNC abuse and lack of access. Jordan and other similarly
situated countries can improve their access by adding precise language to prevent exploitation.

IV. Compulsory Licensing by the Central Government and
Exportation with Section 92A
Compulsory licenses are also justified through section 92 of the
2005 Patent Act which allows India’s central government to grant
compulsory licenses whenever it is deemed extremely necessary.
32

Ankit Rastogi, M/s. BDR Pharmaceuticals International Pvt. Ltd. v.
M/s. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. (December 2013), https://indiancaselaws.
wordpress.com/2013/12/09/ms-bdr-pharmaceuticals-international-pvt-ltdv-ms-bristol-myers-squibb-co/.
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This differs from section 84 which only allows compulsory licenses
to be granted to a company who wants to manufacture the generic.
A compulsory license is deemed necessary during:
(a) a circumstance of national emergency,
(b) a circumstance of extreme urgency, or
(c) a case of public non-commercial use.33
Other countries under the TRIPS agreement are able to declare a
national emergency to request compulsory licenses. The 2005 Patent
Act allows India-based companies to receive compulsory licenses to
manufacture and export a pharmaceutical to another nation with a
national pharmaceutical emergency. Section 92(A) allowed this and
was incorporated in the 2005 amendment of the Patent Act for the
granting of pharmaceutical product exports in certain “exceptional”
circumstances. Section 92(A) focuses on India’s right to manufacture and export patented pharmaceuticals to the licensee if the country cannot manufacture the product on its own and if the licensee
country is addressing a public health concern.34 The licensee must
notify the WTO Council of their intention to import pharmaceutical
products. If the country is a member of the WTO, it must grant a
compulsory license for import of drugs.35
India’s section 92(A) states that India-based companies may
allow “for the manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical
products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity to address public health needs.”36 Section 92(A) facilitates
compulsory licenses that grant India-based companies the right to
manufacture and export a patented product to the licensee. Indiabased companies cannot sell the drug within India itself. Thailand,

33

The Patents Act, Sec. 92 of 2005 http://indiacode.nic.in.

34

Mrinalini Gupta, India: Compulsory licensing for three more patented
cancer drugs, mondaq (2013), http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/227102/
Patent/Compulsory+Licensing+For+Three+More+Patented+Cancer+Dru
gs.

35

S. S. Rana & Co., supra note 13.

36

Konde, supra note 2, at 66-68.
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Zimbabwe,37 and South Africa are a few of the countries that use
compulsory licenses to import generic pharmaceuticals from India.38
This section protects countries from a medicine crisis when patents or manufacturing sites are of concern. Countries have permission to import medicine from India through the Patent Act. However,
without India’s Section 92(A) exportation from India would not be
possible. This section safeguards India-based companies’ rights to
manufacture and export drugs that other countries desperately need,
even if the drug has not been made as a generic in India. Jordan has
followed India’s example and also allows exportation of drugs when
a compulsory license is granted.39

V. The Herclon Case and the Issue of Biosimilars
In 2013, India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
announced its exploration of a proposal from the Health Ministry
to issue a compulsory license for the cancer treating drug Herclon
(trastuzumab).40 Under section 92, the Health Ministry advocated
compulsory licensing because Herclon cost $1,050. The government
felt that this disparity between price and affordability was a case of
public non-commercial use under section 92(c).41
To prevent India from granting a compulsory license Roche
Holdings did not seek a patent in India for Herclon. Instead, Roche
Holding gained approval in India to manufacture a generic version
of Herclon. Roche Holding approved Emcure Pharmaceutical Ltd.
(Emcure), an India-based company, to manufacture and sell the generic version of Herclon, known as Biceltis.42 Emcure and Roche
37

Armouti supra note 14, at 402.

38

CPTech, Examples of Health-Related Compulsory Licences, CPTech
(2015) http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html.

39

Armouti supra note 14, at 394.

40

Gupta, supra note 34.

41

Lane, supra note 16.

42

The Hindu Bus. Line, (2012) https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/emcure-to-make-market-roche-products/article20497435.ece1.
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Holding both sold the drug in India with different versions that were
marketed and sold separately. Biceltis costs approximately $800,
$250 less than the branded original. By allowing a generic version
of its drug, Roche Holdings avoided a compulsory license. This effectively prevented a case of public non-commercial use based on
the new more affordable price of the generic.43
However, without a patent Roche Holdings cannot prevent other
companies from developing drugs that serve similar functions as
Herclon. This complicates pharmaceutical access. The companies
Biocon and Mylan developed a biosimilar—a different drug that is
designed to accomplish the same function—to Herclon for roughly
$650. The lower price motivates many Indian citizens to buy the
cheapest option. Yet, biosimilars are typically lower quality than
the branded and generic drugs. Branded drugs are required to go
through trials whereas biosimilars are not. Because India does not
require biosimilars to be clinically tested, the only way to ensure the
safety of the drug in India is when clinical testing is required for the
drug to enter another country’s market.44
The side effects of biosimilars that are not globalized remain unknown in addition to the drug’s effectiveness and safety for humans.
Without regulation, low-cost drugs will inevitably become lowquality drugs.45 The market for generics must be carefully monitored
so that quality of drugs does not decrease. The quality of medicine is
just as important as access. 46 Because of this, India should consider
a testing requirement on biosimilars.

43

Kenan Machado, Generic Herceptin Approved in India; India’s Biocon to Market Generic Version of Breast-Cancer Drug, Wall Street J.
(2013), https://search.proquest.com/docview/1462049894/abstract/92B76
9B19F244A93PQ/1?accountid=4488.

44

Gupta, supra note 34.

45

G. de L. Lopes, Cost comparison and economic implications of commonly used originator and generic chemotherapy drugs in India, 24 annals of
oncology 13, 13-16 (2013) (discussing bio-equivalence studies).

46

Machado, supra note 43.
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VI. What India Protects Innovation: Section 107A(a)
Although biosimilars are a concern to the state’s welfare, they
also show India’s ability to innovate. India protects innovation
through the combined influence of compulsory licensing and section
107A(a) of the Patent Act—an exemption of a patentee’s exclusive
rights.
107A. Certain acts not to be considered as infringement -For
the purposes of this Act, (a) any act of making, constructing, using or selling a patented invention solely for uses reasonably relating to the
development and submission of information required under
any law for the time being in force, in India, or in a country
other than India, that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product;
(b) importation of patented products by any person from a
person who is duly authorized by the patentee to sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as an infringement of patent rights.47
Compulsory licensing has the potential to harm innovation, but Section 107A(a) endeavors to further protect pharmaceutical innovation.
This exemption incentivizes innovation by allowing generic producers to experiment with patented drugs and produce them in limited
quantities for research to provide generics once the patent is expired.
The exemption can be used before the patent expires and is designed
to promote local R&D.
After being granted a compulsory license, Natco Pharma was
barred from exporting Nexavar (sorafenat) to China’s Hisun Pharmaceutical for regulatory approval by Chinese authorities. To gain
approval, Hisun Pharmaceutical needed to carry out bioequivalence,
a measure of how well two drugs can be used in the place of one
another, and bioavailability, how effectively a dosage is dispersed to
the body.

47

The Patents Act, Sec. 107A of 2005 http://indiacode.nic.in.
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In March 2014, Bayer filed with the Delhi High Court to reject
Natco Pharma’s certificates for export because Bayer claimed Natco
Pharma was infringing on its patent rights by exporting the drug for
human clinical trials. Bayer argued the compulsory license did not
permit Natco Pharma to export the drug. But the Delhi High Court
allowed Natco to apply for exportation of the drug.48
The court held that exports and use of the patented product for
submission was permitted by Section 107A(a) and justified by the
compliance of laws outside of India. The judge expansively interpreted Section 107A(a) and held that the sale of patented products
even outside India would fall within the scope of Section 107A(a),
provided the sale is reasonably related to development and submission of information. The court ruled that because Natco exported
the drugs for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approvals, it was
permissible. The court reviewed the TRIPS agreement and Section
107A(a) with its 2005 amendment.49
Bayer appealed before the Hon’ble Division Bench and another
judge interpreted Section 107A(a) even more expansively than the
last holding saying the language of this provision allows patented
inventions to be exported from India as long as they are for the development of innovating new pharmaceuticals required under any
national laws that regulate its production.50
The judicial precedent of the case and Section 107A(a) provides
a safe harbor provision to protect research and development that
would otherwise be categorized as patent infringement. Researchers can now experiment with new variations on a drug to improve
efficacy or attempt to create a new drug from a known active ingredient. Access to research of this type furthers novelty, innovation, and
experimentation. This protection safeguards generics while also
48

The Pharma Letter, Bayer Cancer Drug Faces New Patent Problems
In India (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/bayercancer-drug-faces-new-nexavar-patent-problems-in-india.

49

Anand K. Sharma & E. Robert Yoches, U.S. Patent Litigation: A Primer
For Indian Companies, Finnegan (Apr. 2008), https://www.finnegan.com/
en/insights/u-s-patent-litigation-a-primer-forindian-companies.html.

50

Id.

48
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providing a legal platform to expand current medical knowledge.
India promotes innovation through Section 107A(a). Jordan, a large
drug manufacturer, can benefit from a similar clause protecting its
right to innovate.

VII. Why Innovation and Compulsory Licensing
Must Coexist
Compulsory licenses are allowed so that patent holders do not
abuse their exclusive rights; thus, it protects LMI countries from
companies that create monopolies on pharmaceuticals. Because
the patent holder is often the only manufacturer of a drug with a
very specific function other drugs cannot accomplish, pharmaceutical patent holders often find themselves with a monopoly on an
irreplaceable drug. Only the corporation sells the drug and because
the corporation has no competition it can price the drug however it
wishes without competitors to keep price low. This is especially concerning to LMI countries where high prices can mean the difference
between life and death.51
A. Western Concerns
Compulsory licenses prevent exorbitantly high drug prices
which helps protect poorer countries. Although now, poorer governments are concerned that granting compulsory licenses will make
companies less likely to enter their markets. This concern is furthered by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressing its view of
India’s use of compulsory licenses:
An active compulsory licensing mechanism and a government
bias towards its use is the most extreme option; it signals to innovative investors that patent rights are discretionary... Furthermore,
pricing that does not properly value innovation has the impact of
undermining and devaluing IP and access to innovation,” adding
that the organization would welcome an approach that is “predicated
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on consistency, transparency, predictability, and return of fair value
for innovation.52
However, India’s rejection of BDR Pharmaceuticals’ compulsory licensing application shows that the government is consistent,
transparent, and predictable in its compulsory license rulings.53 India will not just give a compulsory license to any entity that applies
for one. India’s rulings show no bias toward compulsory licensing,
but only that it will uphold its laws and protect access to medicine.
According to a Johns Hopkins study, potentially $843 billion
is saved each year in India by using generic substitutions. This research focuses on cost per patient, per cycle of the drug for India
using generic substitutions for common cancer chemotherapy drugs.
Paclitaxel (Taxol) is 23% of the original drug cost, docetaxel (Taxotere) is 24%, gemcitabine is 36%, oxaliplatin is 32%, and irinotecan
is 8.9% the cost of the branded drug.54 While this does not consider
other countries who have benefitted from India’s section 92(A), these
numbers are a reminder that an increase in pharmaceutical access is
a possibility for other diseases.
B. Indian Innovation and MNCs
India pharmaceutical firms have been granted a large share of
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)—a request generic
drugs must file to gain approvals in the U.S. before they are approved
for the market. As of 2015, India’s share was more than 40% of
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ANDA.55 India-based companies’ ability to increase their market
share in India shows that there has not been a decline in innovation
within India. Compulsory licensing does not inhibit innovation as
seen by India’s market share of drugs. India’s patent law focuses on
the “prevention of abuse and protection of consumer interests.”56 The
pre-TRIPS regime in India specialized in reverse engineering generic drugs. The manufacturing abilities of the old generics regime allows Indian pharmaceutical companies to increase production faster.
This sturdy foundation in pharmaceuticals has increased FDA (US)
approval rates of many Indian pharmaceutical companies.
Furthermore, patents provide incentives to invest in drug development. A major concern of the United States is compulsory licensing will stop corporations from recouping profits for R&D and
production. India’s generic regime has focused largely on a market to
LMI countries where many MNCs have not bothered to tap the market. Often, this is because most people in these LMI countries cannot afford the exorbitant prices. By licensing to generic companies,
a corporation can extend the reach of a drug and recoup profits from
a royalty. It can negotiate its royalty rather than the typical 6% given
without choice through a compulsory license. Voluntary licensing
also prevents MNCs from having to build infrastructure in the area
to manufacture pharmaceuticals.
Pharmaceutical prices in richer countries often tend to “subsidize” the price of drugs in LMI countries. The New York Times covered Gilead Science’s application for tenofovir in India. The Times
said tenofovir was sold for approximately $5,500 in high-income
countries. However, Gilead Science was selling tenofovir in LMI
countries for approximately $205. This suggests that some companies can keep prices low in LMI countries to match need and demand. It cannot be assumed that branded drugs will increase prices
simply because they can. However, voluntary licensing can benefit
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both companies within the nation, who earn a profit from manufacturing, and MNCs, who gain a royalty without providing for the cost
of production.57

VIII. Conclusion
Compulsory licensing in India increases access to medicines.
Compatibility between rewarding innovation and providing much
needed access is possible with compromise. If other LMI countries
decide to use compulsory licenses, they should use India’s Patent
Act as a model to ensure protection to the patent holder while giving
the country’s government the ability to prove whether compulsory
licenses are a valid course of action. As a model, India must work to
require a stricter application process for voluntary licensing before
a compulsory license may be approved by the government. It must
also become strict on biosimilars and the quality of cheaper drugs
by requiring clinical testing. Because of India’s exportation, other
countries are increasingly allowing compulsory licenses. With India
as a model, countries may adopt provisions in the future to protect
compulsory licenses and grant them fairly.
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